The West Coast Offense (WCO) is a name generally
associated with legendary San Francisco coach Bill Walsh. The early roots of
this offense were instilled by Marv Levy, then head coach at the University of
California Berkeley and further developed in the vertical passing offense of Al
Davis, a disciple of Sid Gillman, but took hold in 1968, when Walsh joined the
staff of iconic coach Paul Brown with the AFL expansion Cincinnati Bengals. It
was there that Walsh developed the philosophy now known as the "West Coast
Offense.”
Interestingly enough, Brown is also the mentor of Don
Shula and many of the innovators who pioneered the modern NFL passing game.
Until this time and even in Shula’s early years with the Dolphins, the NFL was
primarily a running league. Like the running game, the early passing game was a
highly disciplined precision offense, practiced to perfection. The schemes and
routes rehearsed until a system of timing developed that took advantage of a Quarterback’s
footwork to release the ball in precise rhythm with cuts of a primary receiver.
The basic change in the WCO is not necessarily the actual
plays; it is more the freedom given to the QB to exploit a defense by removing
the rigid constraints encouraged by the Lombardi inspired running attack. Offenses
were being defended by reading blocking patterns and sending more defenders to
the point of attack on a run play or dropping into coverage when blocking
schemes dictated a pass. The WCO was developed to exploit defensive adjustments
by the extension of layers within the basic play.
In the WCO passing game, it is important that both the
quarterback and the receivers be able to read the coverage of the defense. Unlike
many passing plays that are designed for a primary receiver, the quarterback
needs to be able to choose the receiver he is going to throw the ball to prior
to the snap. The receivers need to be able to recognize the coverage, and make necessary adjustments to their routes, or even run entirely
different routes. The WCO does not rely on a dominate receiver because any receiver
can become the primary receiver based on the read at the line of scrimmage.
The much talked about receiver progression is not driven
by the QBs ability to identify different targets in the course of a play, but
by the design of the play moving defenders away from the intended target. A
quick pass on a three-step drop, is followed by the same receiver running the
same pattern, looking exactly the same but with the intention of exploiting the
defender adjusting to that route while leaving a route behind him open.
The first fifteen to twenty plays are often scripted
to see how the defense reacts to those plays in order to understand how that
will affect the secondary and tertiary layers of the same play. That is what
all those pictures fans see QBs and coaches look at on the sideline, not the
actual play, but how the defense reacted to it. With the WCO offense, the same
play is dynamic and designed to exploit a defense in motion, using the defense
against itself in the course of a game.
The philosophical difference in Miami will come from a
change to attacking from the offensive side of the ball verses the defensive
side. Bill Parcells was a defensive coach, who believed football games were won the
defensive side of the ball, with the offense responsible for scoring points,
but most importantly, for ball control, and not giving away points. Tony
Sparano, as a disciple of Parcells, followed the same philosophy and the
Dolphins were built in that image.
The hiring of Dan Henning is a clear indication of this
philosophy, because the Henning offense was a regimented run based offense that
employed a dominate receiver in passing situations. It is easy to see why
Brandon Marshall was acquired given these constraints. Sparano knew the philosophy
was antiquated and tried to modernize it by dabbling with the Wildcat and then hiring Brian Daboll, but the structure
initiated by Parcells and Henning could not evolve, especially in the presence
of Brandon Marshall, though it did begin to take root.
Now, removing Marshall from the equation not only makes
sense, but also is imperative to the evolution of the Miami offense. The teams
now playing at the top of the league with the possible exception of the Giants…
Green Bay, New Orleans, New England among others have abandoned the notion of
defense winning championships, but a combination of both will always be
necessary.
In Miami, there will not be an extreme change on the
defensive side of the ball, but the offense will look more like the Marino era
than any conception that has followed. This philosophy puts a premium on QB
play, but is actually QB friendly due the use of layered plays. In a layered
offense, plays are built from basic three step drops that grow from the quick
out, slant and Hitch, to five-step drops and seven-step drops designed to give
the receivers time to maneuver before the ball is thrown. This technique gives
maximum separation between the receiver and defenders, whether running vertical
routes or crosses.
It will take time, but it is apparent why many folks
around the league think Ryan Tannehill may be further ahead of Moore or Garrard
in many aspects of this offense. It is also clear why Tannehill was drafted. What
is not clear is why Matt Flynn was left on the table, but Joe Philbin and Mike
Sherman are much better judges of these two players than personnel folks less familiar with both.
Welcome to a new world in Miami where the West Coast
Offense takes center stage!
